Out of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of justice, a federal court will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim in a petition for habeas corpus absent a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the default.
-- Justice O'Connor, Dretke v. Haley
In 1997, Michael Haley was sentenced to serve 16 years and 6 months in prison for violating the Texas habitual offender law. Texas officials concede Haley did not violate this law. They agree that Haley is guilty only of theft, a crime with a 2-year maximum sentence. Yet, despite the fact that Haley served more than two years in prison for his crime, Texas officials come before our Court opposing Haley's petition for relief. They wish to send Haley back to prison for a crime they agree he did not commit. ...
Perhaps some would say that Haley's innocence is a mere technicality, but that would miss the point. In a society devoted to the rule of law, the difference between violating or not violating a criminal statute cannot be shrugged aside as a minor detail. It may be that Haley's case provides a convenient mechanism to vindicate an important legal principle. Beyond that, however, Michael Haley has a greater interest in knowing that he will not be reincarcerated for a crime he did not commit. It is not clear to me why the State did not exercise its power and perform its duty to vindicate that interest in the first place.
-- Justice Kennedy, dissenting
The unending search for symmetry in the law can cause judges to forget about justice. This should be a simple case.
-- Justice Stevens (joined by Kennedy and Souter), dissenting
Simple Case Of Injustice: The Supreme Court handed down a striking opinion yesterday. The case involved a sixteen year sentence handed down after the robbery of a calculator. The sentence grew out of "three strikes" statute and was based on the fact that he was convicted of delivery of amphetamine and aggravated (use of weapon) robbery. The immediate problem is that the second offense was not carried out after the final judgment was handed down on the first, which is when the offense counts pursuant to the three strikes law. The rule is not just a technicality -- until final judgment, a person is not clearly guilty. At any rate, there was another major problem, though only the lower courts really emphasized it -- he was really convicted of attempted robbery, clearly an inferior offense. [see here]
Suffice to say, he was clearly not guilty of the "crime" that resulted in the sixteen year sentence. No one, not the prosecutors, lower court judges [note this took place in Texas, a place where the courts are not known to be overly liberal; in fact, the Supreme Court had to specifically overturn them], or even the justices of the Supreme Court. The problem, which again the conservative leaning judges of Texas didn't think inhibited them to hold keeping a person guilty of a crime with a top sentence of two years for over six in jail is patently unjust, was that his lawyers didn't timely raise the problem. [It did open up an additional claim -- inefficient counsel. A conflict of interest issue also arose, but was not ultimately at issue in this case.] Thus, for reasons of "orderly administration of justice" [sic], relief was denied.
The majority opinion was 6-3 and included Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, generally considered "liberal." Putting aside that they always do not act in a way fitting of that term, it might at first seem curious that they joined the opinion. The "out," however, was that the defendant still had the ability to raise an ineffective assistance counsel claim, one that the state admitted was viable and "significant"; Likewise, as he makes it, the state "assured [the Court] that it will not seek to reincarcerate" him. How very generous! As it continues to resist relief to a person it clearly admits was in jail for over four years longer than the law allowed, they will not put him in jail!
This is where Justice Kennedy's eloquent dissent that one responsibility of giving the state discretion is that they will use it to deal with this sort of problem without the courts having to step in enters the picture. One should recall that he got the seat that originally was going to go to Judge Bork. Likewise, he has made some noteworthy comments on problems with the current criminal justice system. His dissent, which should be read by all, is therefore not without precedent. It all the same is noteworthy for its tone, in part:
"It is not clear to me why the State did not exercise its power and perform its duty to vindicate that interest in the first place. ... These mechanisms hold out the promise that mercy is not foreign to our system. The law must serve the cause of justice."
Justice Stevens noted that cases like this are where courts have an "obligation to serve the cause of justice" because the state did not. It shows the need and value of having a method to get such relief, such as by habeas corpus petitions. All the same, it is not the only means available. The government as a whole has the responsibility to render justice. The concerns by the majority that stepping in here will be an unnecessary interference might be a lot more credible if we could have the assurance that others would step it to deal with these troubling cases. And, in many cases they do. All the same, in many cases they do not, resulting in a case where -- even when the state clearly is wrong on the basic facts -- there can be no middle ground.
This is bad in general, and it is bad here. Power obligates those who hold it to use it wisely, not as a matter of brunt force.
See Also: The Washington Post has a striking story that provides historical insight on why Justice Stevens was so forceful in his opposition to the government's position in the Guantanamo Bay detainee cases. He in particular mentioned a little known case [later overruled] that arguably served as the basis of a case soon after that allowed the government to argue the base was out of the reach of the courts. Stevens helped write the dissent, serving as a law clerk to Justice Rutledge, after Stevens served in the navy during WWII. The dissent included passionate words that were taken directly from Stevens notes to the justice. Given his penchant for quoting himself, if Justice Stevens writes an opinion, I would not be surprised if the passage comes up once again.