When examining how the national government handled the lead-up to the events, hindsight clouds our vision some, but some criticisms can fairly be made. This does not mean that if such and such would have been done, the attacks would have been prevented. All the same, the attacks were not somehow foreordained (though some might so think), and they might have been prevented. I find it annoying when this pretty uncontroversial statement is somehow deemed outrageous. Or, when the attempt to point to mistakes is supposed to imply we are blaming. This assumes liability, which does not necessarily follow.
Some want to make 9/11 as a sort of totally shocking event, as if there was no way in hell that we could have imagined it would occur, or do anything to prevent it. The idea that no one imagined a plane would be used as a weapon is such an example. This isn't true, it tries to prove too much. The Summer of 2001 also brought forth a lot of "chatter" that something big was about to occur. [The report is sympathetic to Richard Clarke and his concerns.]
Yes, it seemed to concern something overseas, but domestic action was not ruled out. Little was done though deal with such a threat, in part because Attorney General Ashcroft assumed the domestic sphere was safe. I question if this was justified and wonder if the Bush Administration's apparent lack of concern for the Al Qaida threat (with domestic aspects) that they were strongly warned about by the outgoing Bush Administration (though the Bushies don't quite recall such emphasis, Clinton, Berger, and Clarke do) had something to do with it. They needed a lot less to go after Iraq.
I admit the matter is hazy, though an alert might very well have brought to attention various hints that something was amiss, including the capture of Moussaoui (who the Report suggests might have been a backup hijacker though the "20th" hijacker was probably someone else). It could have speeded things up or put more people on alert on the importance of keeping one's eye out. For instance, a captured terrorist suggested that just the capture of Moussaoui (if known) could have stopped the plot.
Ashcroft's snide attempt to blame some of the problems in sharing essential information that summer on the "Gorelick Memo"* (thus targeting a commission member), however, was directly refuted:
"We believe the Attorney General's testimony does not fairly or accurately reflect the significance of the 1995 documents and their relevance to the 2001 discussion."
There was a big problem in sharing important information among different agencies, including (sometimes especially) between the criminal and intelligence side aka "The Wall." It bears noting, however, why this was so. Quite often, it was more a problem of interagency relations than any legal barrier (or policy arising from one). If anything, the Bush Administration only made the problem worse, and still do in various cases.
There was also, and this sadly affected an investigation that summer, a confusion on what the rules truly were. Finally, hesitance to "press the envelope" often arose because the government's own misdeeds led to blowback and then perhaps excessive caution in response. The technical "wall" was in fact quite narrow, and in response to legitimate constitutional concerns. I believe the assumed need for the USA Patriot Act to "solve" an exaggerated problem was an example of overkill.
The infamous 8/6 Memo also is supposed to be deemed of no value. Not true. Important basics are there, including the desire to attack our soil, al-Qua'da [memo spelling] members living in and traveling to the U.S., suspected interest in federal buildings, and talk of hijacking (also an attempt to target LAX). Furthermore, as suggested above, it is not like the memo stood alone: it summarized a decent amount of intel that some felt was not properly handled. For instance, greater concern for "traveling" terrorists might have resulted in flagging at least two that was involved in the hijackings.
The Report supplies a depressing account about how the Clinton and Bush Administrations could think of little to do to respond to the threat of Bin Laden and Al Qaida. The core problem was that the target was too diffuse, Pakistan stood in the way of direct action, and there was fear of any collateral damage. One might imagine, given the time, Kerry would have acted in a similar fasion. [It bears noting that even after 9/11, our approach in Afghanistan left a bit to be desired, especially the reliance on locals.]
There was also a strong need for "proof" and "sure thing" assurance, which is just hard to get. This was a core reason why nothing was done (by either administration) in response to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Other matters, both political (impeachment) and international (Serbia, Iraq, Haiti, and so on) seemed more pressing. Also, the Bush Administration planned to focus on other things -- note that their perceived expertise didn't work out in this case.
The failure to properly process information and deal with the resulting intelligence was a bit less understandable. Also, though the Clinton Administration is to be applauded for realizing the potential of the new threat and starting to understand/deal with it, it can be blamed for not properly making it an issue. A few speeches and budget requests were not really enough. The Congress and public at large should have understood that international terrorism was an important matter to think about in 2000. Times were not as safe and cozy as some thought.
On this, the commission members were right, a failure of imagination was a big part of the problem.
[This review of Jonathan's Randal's new book also suggests lack of knowledge, such as, "how to navigate among tribes, local customs, ways of conducting business and sharing power that at first glance made no sense" was part of the equation as well. The book sounds promising.]
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* Commissioner Gorelick had some role in setting up the Clinton Policy (continued by the Bush Administration) regarding the discussed "Wall," but (as discussed in the linked piece) the basic principle was set up a lot earlier. Also, the "Gorelick Memo" not only dealt with a much more narrow matter, it might have helped things somewhat.
I remain opposed to those who suggested she should have stepped down, especially since it is unclear to me why it was not brought up before she sat, and others also had some potential biases. She recused herself from the particular discussion (did those connected to the airlines recuse themselves from that issue?) and the report was unanimous. Also, as with those passionately opposed to Bob Kerrey (the favorite of some, who thought him an equal opportunity critic), there was just too much partisan flavor to the critics to take cries of bias that seriously.