I have begun reading The 9/11 Commission Report. It is written in easily understood English, impressive in itself, and is a reasonable four hundred plus pages (over a hundred pages of end notes as well). There is a lot of material packed in there, so it's hard to take it all in, but a basic broad understanding of the events can be found. After an account of the attacks themselves, for instance, there are chapters concerning the growth of Al Qaeda, a thumbnail history of counterterrorism, and so on.
[A less than friendly Weekly Standard was impressed with the writing style and background materials, if not the proposed solutions. WS seems to be of the "bomb them" mentality.]
The book has good "skim" value. It also, hard as it is to believe, has parts that draw you in, makes you want to turn the page to see what happens next. The first chapter, "We Have Some Planes," has this effect, mixed with an underlining sadness as well as anger at how unprepared the government was when it happened. It is good, if hard, to get a general idea what happened that morning, on the ground and in the air. Life isn't quite Executive Decision, though apparently movies about hijackings were part of terrorists' preparation.
Still ... At 8:19AM, the airline knew the first plane was hijacked, within about five minutes so did the FAA. The plane crashed at 8:46. The President, however, thought it was an accident. This still doesn't justify, in my view, going to a photo op event. It was a national emergency all the same and immediate action had to occur. We read, as well, that every minute counted ... spending ten or more minutes at the school in the middle of an ongoing emergency was just plain wrong. Once he found out about the second attack, such behavior is almost unconscionable.
Also, how in the hell did it take a second crash (over fifteen minutes later), for the President and company to realize it was not an accident? The FAA knew it was a hijacking. NORAD knew since 8:38. We are talking about a plane in domestic air space not too far from major population centers. Did no one uh call the FAA to check? Isn't this what one would do first in the case of such a crash? I just don't understand.
The account also supplies a chilling account of the resulting disorder. The last flight was delayed, which as it turned out, was probably why Congress or the White House was not hit. The delays gave the people on board time to realize what happened and react. Disorder on the ground, including confusion on the military side, suggests a military solution might have not occurred in time. The chilling thing is, however, that there was time to warn the pilots. It took over ten minutes, but Flight 93 was warned. Unfortunately, before confirmation could be sent, the cockpit was attacked.
Though I have not read the relevant chapters yet, I am a bit uneasy about the gung ho support of the commission's suggested reforms. It is not surprising that an independent commission is being used by Congress for inspiration, since the report itself notes that at least three other times such concerns were tossed to such third parties. And, as a momentum toward change, there is something to be said -- especially if the suggestions are good ones. Still, this does not mean everything it said was gold. Or that change must happen RIGHT NOW. The reforms should be evaluated on their merits and a bit of reflection would be a good thing.
Overall, the paperback version is a good $10 investment (a separate volume of committee reports is also available and on perusal appears of similar value). I shall come back to it with some additional thoughts, as time might warrant.