The Yanks themselves have had problems of late signing free agents without such support, though the eventual decline or departure of their farm material (often overlooked among the focus on their expensive acquitions) was perhaps equally important. Yankee fans will miss Pedro, especially given the team's ability to beat him. Schilling is a more troubling nemesis, no one really has the heart to really dislike Wells, and even Wakefield is a pain.
Marcia Hamilton discusses the case of the porn selling police officer* here noting: "the answer should have been obvious: Roe could not use the First Amendment as a shield to engage in conduct that was fundamentally at odds with the department's public mission. ... When on the force, he could be forced to divorce his private activities from his official duties and identity. But once he is off the force, he may do as he likes." Though not intending to do so, she hits home the overbreadth of the opinion as well as its noncontroversial aspect, which should would have been enough to decide the question.
Though the opinion does not limit itself to the issue, it does emphasize how Roe's actions took advantage of his role as police officer, so clearly falls under the legit authority of his government employers. This limits his rights, even if the matter concerned matters a lot less distasteful as well as subject matter of more redeeming interest.
Nonetheless, the opinion did not rest on the fact that Roe blatantly used his office for financial gain in such a demeaning fashion as I think it should have. The opinion went a step further and gratuitously (if vaguely) defined "public interest" and potentially limited the rights of public employees to speak when their actions did not meet such a test.
Likewise, Prof. Hamilton's reasoning has troubling breadth. I'm not sure what "fundamentally at odds" means: does any discussion of uneasiness with current law meet this test, given his duty to uphold the law? Surely not, since police officers and others in law enforcement do discuss the possibility of reform without losing their jobs. Perhaps, you need (though again the opinion can be read both ways) to have that added connection ... the "forced to divorce" requirement comes in.
Thus, we often see a priviso that "these are not the views of 'x' organization, just this writer" and so forth. Still, we still know the person is a member of the organization: Roe didn't say he was acting as a member of his department, just that he was a member of law enforcement. Or, let's say, Roe was involved in similar activity, but not for financial gain. Would people knowing he is a police officer suggest his private sexual activities are enough for his dismissal? It did in the past.
Experience has shown that common sense, whatever that might mean, is not always used in this area. Taking advantage of your employment for financial gain in the way involved here (as compared to perhaps something with more worthwhile content) is a pretty easy case, but the basis of the decision is not limited to these facts. Nor is the financial gain component all that Prof. Hamilton is concerned about. She also is concerned about when "Alabama Judge Ashley McKathan appeared to conduct a trial in a judicial robe embroidered with an easily readable version of the Ten Commandments."
The judge made clear that this was an expression of his belief on the importance of the Ten Commandments to the proper functioning of law, which led Prof. Hamilton to be concerned about the appearance of partiality. Problem? Let's say yes, especially given the alteration of the "uniform" of the employee, which connects to the Roe case. I wonder, however, the limiting principle. Would a cross, perhaps big enough to be fairly obvious, along with public statements about his belief of the importance of "God's law" also (ahem) cross the line?
What about a chain with a Ten Commandments charm? Surely, even if you cannot read them, it is pretty clear what two gold tablets represents. Or, perhaps a yarmulke ... would this suggest partiality to Jewish litigants (or a bias against members of the Islamic faith)? How about if the judge only talked about such things, underlining that the law doesn't really work that way as currently formulated? Fundamentally at odds?
Tricky, though the religious content brings in special concerns separate from those involved in Roe. A careful formulation of the rules can get around such shoals, but it goes back to my original distaste with the justices taking a case with relatively "easy facts" among the thousands out there, and using it to somewhat "clarify" what Prof. Hamilton notes is a muddy area of the law.
For though quite arguably in this case "the answer should have been obvious," the application of the broader themes are much less so. This includes actions by public officials, speech and activities of a sexual nature, controversial or distasteful matters, and so forth. The duty and ultimate pleasure of applying the law must take such nuances into account, especially since the penalties (e.g. losing a job) often is quite great as is the possible reach.
The ultimate importance is great indeed: given the private and public spheres can never completely be separated, what limitations are justified once you become a servant of the state? Given the incestuous relationship between the state and business these days, the question definitely goes beyond porn selling police officers and judges who use their robes as bulletin boards for their personal beliefs. In fact, sometimes one might wish such things are all we have to worry about. We don't, and so it goes.
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* This would be a good title for a Perry Mason episode.