Planned Parenthood v. Taft:
A preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of an Ohio statute prohibiting the off-label use of an abortion drug is vacated in part insofar as it prohibits constitutional applications of the law where, although the district court erred in holding that every state which regulates abortion must include a health or life exception, there was no abuse of discretion in a finding that plaintiffs established a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their challenge. (Amended opinion)
I referenced this opinion in the past in part because it underlines regulation of medicine it largely a state function. Likewise, it suggests the likelihood that Ayotte (life/health exception necessary for parental notification law) will result in opinions like this -- blanket laws limiting abortion in some fashion will be saved by means of court enforced health/life exceptions.
Finally, it suggests an answer to something I'm curious about: just what is the definition of "health" in this context? After all, even viable fetuses can be aborted to save the health or life of the mother. The best one can tell from Supreme Court rulings is that the term is defined by appropriate medical judgment. This ruling reasons that "significant" medical judgment must be present, dissenting opinions not enough to negate this. In other words, nothing trivial (a head cold) and/or something a doctor only concerned with his/her fee would allow.
This takes a bit of reasoning that might not necessarily follow, but it is a logical reading. In practice, since the usually banned activity is in some fashion dangerous, it probably would be malpractice to perform the abortion etc. for trivial reasons. OTOH, what if the fetus is severely deformed? Would the mental health issues involved be enough?
Jones v. City of Los Angeles:
The Eighth Amendment prohibits defendant, the City of Los Angeles, from punishing involuntary sitting, lying, or sleeping on public sidewalks that is an unavoidable consequence of being human and homeless without shelter in the city.
Ninth Circuit, so do not assume it necessarily will hold, but this is another interesting decision largely based on Powell v. Texas. Or, rather, trying to reading between the lines of that decision. Powell turns on the fifth vote of Justice White, who originally was going to vote with the dissent. The plurality held that public drunkenness is not a "condition" or the involuntary consequence of one. OTOH, mere addiction could not be a crime. Also, adding to privacy rights, the public nature of the crime is key. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion.
But, White's vote was a bit more complex, turning on the absence of evidence (we are talking about the ruling of a police court here -- not a great means to make major constitutional doctrine) that Powell was compelled to be in public. If he was, White might have decided differently. And, so is the case here: there were not enough resources for the homeless here. They were compelled by the "status" of homelessness to be in public, so could not be convicted of homeless acts like sleeping in public. This would have Eighth Amendment problems.
As it does. Justice White's vote btw is a bit amazing. His decision, and implicitly that of five justices at the time, was that a drug addict could not be criminally convicted of using drugs. This would in effect make addicts, though not social users, constitutionally a treatment issue. Now, ironically, a realistic look at use will suggest a majority of illegal drug users are not addicts, though this might be hard to prove in individual cases.
But, it underlines the state of constitutional law in the late 1960s: Justice White and Stewart (who was in the dissent here), two moderately conservative justices in certain ways, would have held drug use in various cases could not be criminal! A sane policy in various respects and one clearly not as impossible to imagine as some might think.