More discussion here, but the Carey v. Musladin ruling was handed down on Monday. It held [Findlaw summary]:
Grant of habeas relief in a first-degree murder case is vacated where the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that a state appeals court's decision, that buttons displaying the victim's image worn by the victim's family during respondent's trial did not deny respondent his right to a fair trial, was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.
As the summary suggests, the matter at hand was a federal statute that limited the discretion of the lower federal courts to review state rulings by means of habeas (corpus) review. If a certain practice was not clearly barred by Supreme Court precedent, the state ruling should be upheld. Since the Supreme Court often speaks in general terms, the lower courts applying broad rules to fact specific cases, this is a problematic policy, probably with constitutional problems to boot. After all, the fact the Supremes might in theory still take the case at hand really does not supply a practical solution. Thus, the law interferes with a basic constitutional purpose of lower court review in the area of due process.
Due process securities arise from the federal Constitution, so is a national right of citizenship that is rightly secured by the federal courts. The argument is that federal courts are too intrusive, second guessing state courts all too often, and not being compelled to do so by current precedent at that. This obviously is a matter of opinion, but the bottom line stays the same -- the Supreme Court simply is not going to supply any real check over the thousands of criminal cases that come up on habeas review. It is not really their job -- day to day affairs fall to lower courts. So, this federalism measure is far from cost-free. Yes, historically, federal courts have had a smaller role in this area. Turning back the clock pre-1960 or so, however, is not something we necessarily want to do either, however.
But, anyway, the ruling was not about the practice at issue -- the opinion noted the matter had not been clearly decided yet. Three justices (Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter) suggested that, should they decide it, such behavior would interfere with fair trial rights. And, felt "clear" (Stevens particularly addressed the point) should not be interpreted too strictly. They joined the opinion, however, on the basic issue. I sort of thought maybe a couple justices, especially Souter, might dissent. Still, the net result is not surprising, especially since the concurrences parsed the lower court pretty thinly -- the issue is a problem, but not always etc.
Though Justice Thomas wrote the opinion, Robertian minimalism strikes again. No wonder the Court's docket is so small -- they do not do much when actually deciding the case. The net result of cases like this, in effect, is to reduce their docket. Of course, if they let things percolate in the lower courts, the net result might be the same. Nearly every case taken is on discretionary review anyway. Still, the alternative path basically would have sent a message that -- the statute at hand notwithstanding -- the federal courts should have a bigger role than the conservatives in control want. This again underlines that the courts are far from totally unaffected by democratic controls -- a federal statute here limited their discretion as did membership arising from choices made by people we elected.
I admit that I find the former a bit questionable, but even I would probably accept some tinkering with the guidelines of such review. Regulating jurisdiction is sometimes legitimate congressional policy pursuant to Art. III. Oh well ... whole thing reminds me of a song my little brother used to sing in school way back when ... something about Sue in a button factory.