A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected heat. It is therefore a species--the most important species--of a "greenhouse gas."
-- Massachusetts v. EPA
Massachusetts v. E.P.A. (5-4, per Stevens, likely suspects joined both sides) is a rather striking ruling. My assumption was that the Court would probably determine that at least the state had standing to sue, it would likely note the law allowed the agency to regulate "greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles," but very well might determine it had the discretion not to do so. Kennedy would be the swing on this point, perhaps having two different sets of justices joining different parts of the opinion as well. And, perhaps, the strong nature of the agency's stance would allow some wiggle room ... a remand to clarify their position. This would be a symbolic victory of sorts on the core issue, though the effort as a whole would advance the cause.
Well, the fact the opinion began with the above quote suggests I was a bit too tentative. The ruling cited a 1907 case (via Holmes) underlining the importance of state plaintiffs, even when standing would not exist for individuals ... "It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air." Kennedy probably appreciated the federalist flavor of the sentiments. CJ Roberts led the way with a less generous view of standing. Reflects expectations of Robert/Alito desire for less judicial involvement, even when statutes seem to so invite.
Next, the statutory interpretation. This is trickier, but helped by the breadth of the EPA's argument. Again, the opinion with all its Stevens glory should put a smile on progressive/environmentalist faces. One can get a taste with this Gore-like statement:
Because of the enormity of the potential consequences associated with man-made climate change, the fact that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the (relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially irrelevant.
Likewise, small steps are noted to be worthwhile. They also had "little trouble" the use of "air pollutant" applied to this case as well. Thus, the EPA's failure to act either had to be backed by a determination that auto exhausts "do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do." The majority did not think much of the reasons supplied on the latter point, and clearly sent a message about their views on the former, but remanded the matter to give the EPA a chance to try again. But, with a clear warning that goes beyond this one issue:
To the extent that [the statute] constrains agency discretion to pursue other priorities of the Administrator or the President, this is the congressional design. EPA has refused to comply with this clear statutory command.
I don't claim the wisdom to determine exactly how accurate the environmentalists are on the specific statutory point, nor do I want to study the point too deeply. But, from my understanding from the discussion of the case on C-SPAN (there was a panel discussion at the time of the oral arguments), I think the plaintiffs would appreciate this ruling fairly well. One of the lawyers specifically noted that a requirement that the EPA clearly clarify why they don't want to act would be deemed a "win," even given its limited nature. A clear denial would be hard and blunt, their avoidance of the issue no longer so tenable.
And, along the way, providing environmentally friendly rhetoric plus giving states (there are always one at least, usually more, willing to do so) clear standing to sue in such cases. Finally, the ruling recognized the interest of the attempt to obtain a regulation in the first place, including judicial review when it is refused, noting in part: "There are key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking [especially when provided by statute] and an agency's decision not to initiate an enforcement action."
One more significant reminder about the lengths the Bush Administration has gone, plus the various means to limit it.