The ultimate value of the 9/11 Commission was the refreshing way it investigated in a public way and expressed its findings in a straightforward way with a reason to hope that it would all be useful in some real fashion. This is one reason such commissions are established to deal with tragedies and other compelling events, suggesting that sometimes an independent body with a single minded focus has its purposes. This might be a result of the current problems with the political system, but so be it.
The nature of the subject overall and the individuals actors makes a small independent commission that is able to put forth unanimous findings and recommendations also useful. This also somewhat limits its ability to supply specifics, but the basic principles it puts forth are in a way no less essential. The Constitution is a basic framework of government, one that can be applied in any number of ways. All the same, the framework, something most of us can largely agree upon, is central.
This is what makes the penultimate chapter, "What to Do? A Global Strategy," so impressive. I must say, and this might temper my thoughts a bit, the strategy is one that mostly appeals to me. For instance:
"[L]ong term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public democracy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool [e.g. war] while neglecting others we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort."
And also, as to measuring success ...
"[T]he targets should be specific enough so that reasonable observers -- in the White House, the Congress [e.g. with oversight reform], the media, or the general public -- can judge whether or not the objectives have been attained. ...
[T]he American public are entitled to expect the government to do its very best. They should expect that officials will have realistic objectives [we shall be attacked in some way again], clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see some standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met."
Suffice to say, the core "global strategy" moves are not military in nature. We must recognize and isolate threats, which sometimes means military involvement, but "soft power" is much more important. This includes support of those who offer alternatives to the seriously troubled societies that terrorists target. Sound like something Democrats can take a hold on or at least opponents of the current administration? Well, no need to stop there ...
We must "encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities" so that the societies themselves (the only ones who truly can) will take the best path. Though supporting the current (imperfect) leadership of Pakistan seems the best way to go, "short-term gains in cooperating with the most repressive and brutal governments were too often outweighed by long-term setbacks." Multilateral organizations will be very important, including in fighting terrorism (e.g. catching traveling terrorists) and controlling the spread of "WMDs."
Homeland defense is also quite important. A core issue here is a better way to control borders and air travel. The report opposes the current strategy of allocating funds by population, not threat level. Executive and legislative oversight also is necessary to evaluate the action taken. Finally, the increased level of government investigation will require more oversight to secure civil liberties. Something that is very important in the international realm as well.
The final chapter deals with a possible re-organization of the government to help carry forth some of these moves. It sort of bogged down in detail, but a few broad measures can be touched upon. It suggests a new intelligence framework headed by a National Intelligence Director with budget and personnel control.
A National Counterterrorism Center would also be a central clearing house of intelligence with corresponding operational planning authority. This is not so in the current Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) that serves this function somewhat but without the oversight power. The core concern is "joint action" and the best use of limited resources, especially analysts and linguists.
The FBI is in the mix, but there would be no separate domestic intelligence area, but a specialized force inside the agency that would also be qualified for in basic criminal justice matters. After all, investigation per se shares basic qualifications, and working with the criminal side will be quite important. A close eye must be kept to insure the agency is kept up to date, including dealing with new threats.
Information is not to be cabined, but shared. Congressional oversight, hindered by being splintered into so many parts, is essential. One small oversight committee should be set up in each house to deal with homeland security. Politics should be kept out of this area as much as possible. Reforms would include making the "overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies" public.
Thus, imagination, joint action, and oversight might be considered essential. The report ends thusly:
"We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and will participate vigorously in that debate."
Amen.