The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...
- U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 4 (Guarantee Clause)
William M. Wiecek is a well respected (legal/politician) historian with a particular focus on antebellum concerns, especially respecting slavery matters. I am familiar with him from citations in various works, but have not really read anything by him in particular. But, if The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution (1972) is representative, his writings should be pretty interesting.
The publication date suggests the book is somewhat out of date, though simply put, its overall theme that the clause is mostly a "sleeping giant" that rarely was used (not always an ideal situation) except by dissenting parties holds true. And, other than some recent law article sort discussion promoting state discretion/federalism ends, the basic concerns addressed in the book also remain largely the same. (See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991) in which discretion over age requirements for state judges was deemed in part to be part of "republican" guarantees, especially unless Congress clearly says otherwise. The book touches upon such state discretion concerns with a their clear Tenth Amendment flavor in passing.*) It is unfortunate, therefore Wiecek never published an update.
By the Constitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to every State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves; but, while the people are thus the source of political power, their governments, National and State, have been limited by written constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set bounds to their own power, as against the sudden impulses of mere majorities.
-- In re Duncan (1891)
We pledge allegiance to a flag that stands for a republic form of government, but the exact contours of the concept is somewhat open to confusion. Overall, the basic idea is that the people would select their leaders pursuant to certain constitutional and legal rules, thus there was no direct democracy or right of some group to rebel against popularly elected authority. In fact, if some subset did unlawfully rebel (e.g., some anti-tax group ala the Shay's Rebellion of the 1780s or a slave revolt), the national government had the power (if asked by the state legislature) to step in to guard against such "domestic violence." Art. IV, companion to Guarantee Clause.
Things got hinky if a state wanted to secede from the Union or total rebellion ala the American Revolution was at stake, but the Constitution assumes this did not occur. Things got more difficult during the Civil War and afterwards, where the Guarantee Clause was seen as of special importance. Congress deemed it their right and obligation to ensure a republican form of government in the former Confederate states, even if they had to do so by the force of military reconstruction. But, this was a special time in our history, and such nationalist involvement in state government was soon seen as problematic. Thus, even when it was clear that the states did not honor the rights of a distinct group of the people in such a way that clearly was non-republican in character, the Congress did not step in.
The Courts were also loathe to do so. Such things seemed too "political" in character, even when the rights of individuals were directly involved. In part, they looked back to the 1840s mostly forgotten "Dorr's Rebellion" and the corresponding case of Luther v. Borden to justify this path. This referred to unrest in Rhode Island, which never did ratify a new constitution even after declaring independence from Great Britain. By the early 1800s, this lead to major malapportionment and disenfranchisement of a majority of the (white male) population. The situation eventually got so obviously unjust that the official government did ratify a new constitution setting forth major reforms. Thus, republican government (including protest by the people) arguably won out in the end.
Nonetheless, a parallel "people's constitution" was ratified, leading to competing governments (though the unofficial one never really amounted to much). This lead to the officially accepted governor to ask President Tyler for assistance given the domestic unrest. Tyler accepted the authority of the official government, denying the right of the people as a whole to claim it was not "republican," but said there was threat of domestic unrest warranting federal involvement. In a court case arising from state actions against the rebel faction, the Supreme Court basically said the whole thing was a "political question," left to Congress and the President, who by statute had authority to use force when necessary pursuant to executive discretion.
This is still good law, but only because the courts reinterpreted what were basically guarantee questions.** Thus, the book ends with the then recent reapportionment cases, particularly Baker v. Carr, an issue that still haunts us, now in particular respecting "political gerrymandering." Aside from the dissents and the gadfly Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court begged off guarantee claims ... no no, this was an equal protection issue. "One person, one vote." This in no way fully fictional, but it surely was incomplete. The cases are also about truly "republican" government, allowing "the great body of the people" (Madison) to control their government, not unbalanced subsets. And, various cases that touch upon this issue (including resisting new qualifications, such as term limits) at times cited the general principle.
[Wiecek in fact notes that state courts were receptive fairly early on to claims of political equality partly under republican government tenets, even when the federal courts were loathe to get involve with such state/political questions. This includesd "upholding stringent election laws regarding the counting of ballots." Again, such a perspective might have been useful in current debates, including the concern of some that Florida courts had no authority to supply equitable relief that interfered with the discretion of state election officials.]
So, why not be honest about it? The clause references the "United States," not one or two branches. The Supreme Court clearly deals with political matters these days, in part because the term fits so many subjects. This was understood early on. From the beginning, "republican" has an expansive reach, including separation of powers and constitutional government, which implies judicial review. This was also shown in the "Democratic-Republican" party, including in respecting various liberties necessary for rule by the people, including a free press ("citizen-critic"). Anti-slavery advocates so republicanism as supporting their cause, even if some groups also argued that things like referenda were anti-republican (the people as a whole should not pass laws, only their representatives).
And, rights of "republican" institutions were cited early on, e.g., the famous Justice Chase opinion in Calder v. Bull (the book cites various others, including by Justice Story). This truly gives a possible expansive reading to the clause, since such cases basically support a Ninth Amendment reading of sorts. But, this is acceptable, since our constitutional government is supposedly republican as a whole, and spells out its meaning (some went further, and referenced the Declaration of Independence as controlling). Thus, yes federalism guards against excessive national involvement, but the Fourteenth Amendment supplies certain authority to Congress to enforce national liberties from state violation. A meaning that Wiecek says is not set in stone, but develops over time (living Constitution approach), especially as the Constitution itself expands over time. [He does not emphasize the point, but when you have the Thirteenth Amendment, saying slavery is anti-republican is much easier.]
The particular concern of the Guarantee Clause can be focused upon aside from its broad contours. In other words, the particular concern of the people electing their representatives. Thus, there is a fundamental right to vote, though the Supreme Court (aside from Justice Douglas, natch) is loathe to directly place it in this clause. And, though the courts have a role, the Congress has a very important one as well (in part by setting forth laws that the courts help enforce). This is important to underline: political questions still contain fundamental constitutional principles and obligations.
The Supreme Court basically said that the determining whether a state has a republican form of government and if national force is needed to enforce its tenets (or guard against domestic violence) were complex political questions that the courts could not practically handle. This gives the political branches a certain flexibility, the courts only stepping in at worse to deal with crystal clear error. Such error was the impetus of the 1960s "one person, one vote" cases and arguably should have made the political gerrymandering case in Texas a sound claim. Likewise, some note that courts could find the system is unrepublican (perhaps, by election clauses overall, states limited to how they can regulate the "manner" of elections), but let political branches determine exactly how to solve the problem. But, such branches often fail to uphold its obligations:
... republican government should also require the purity of the electoral process, if self-government and majority rule are to be anything more than pious slogans. ... The guarantee clause at the end of the Reconstruction period had become a dead letter; Congress abdicated all responsibility under it.
This sets off alarm bells given recent history. The importance of the clause and the basic (almost truistic) principle it reaffirms is all the more underlined given its avoidance by those responsible for its security. Thus, it is left to dissident minority factions in Congress to perform in effect unofficial hearings on the problems with the 2004 election or largely ignored (after all, some black woman "left" type headed the effort) hearings by the civil rights commission that underlined the problems of the 2000 election. We have a token, and to that degree if anything counterproductive, challenge to the Ohio electoral count in Congress, who fails to seriously honor its obligation to secure honest elections.
The fact that the "Republican Party" leads the country when it selectively guarantees a republican form of government is ironic, but the amusing aspect should not lead us to ignore the serious problem that continues to be in place. After all, from the beginning, "civic virtue" was also deemed an essential aspect of republicanism. This is ultimately left to we the peopl, as shown by the last words in the book:
What this republic can become, only we and those who follow us can determine. It is up to us to realize the promise of the guarantee.
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* I also found John Hart Ely Jr.'s wrinkle to the clause, see Democracy and Distrust, interesting. Ely (RIP) argued that it might serve as a way against overuse of agencies, especially when they basically become excessive law making institutions. This in a republic is left to elected legislatures. Art. I guards against overly delegating national legislative power, but Ely say this clause as a check respecting state legislative power. Perhaps, the courts could not adequately set forth clear rules, but this would suggest a responsibility for other branches all the same. Again, the clause speaks of the "United States," an obligation that is spread over to us all.
**Some oppose limits on homosexuals and other groups via state constitutional barriers in part on republican principles, which disfavors keeping out groups of the people from government, but the Supreme Court took the equal protection route in Romer v. Evans. Interestingly, the ruling cited the dissent in Plessy for its understanding of the problems with caste legislation, a dissent that in part (admittedly in passing) noted that discrimination against blacks in part was non-republican.