Some note that the Iowa Supreme Court in part addressed the public at large. This makes sense, since the issue is of particular concern for the public, aka not only the governed but the governors ("we the people"). There is some debate at that link, but yes, both clarity and honesty should be used. Justices have almost bragged that the courts explain themselves. They should do so in ways that are not some sort of corrupt code. Meanwhile, some evidence (see also comments) that lame ass criticism do not only come from conservatives.
More evidence that well written opinions worthy of broad audiences is shown by Judge Bates ruling on some Bagram detainees. The breadth is suggested by this tidbit from the referenced discussion:
The judge, while rejecting a government claim that extending habeas to anyone at Bagram would extend the Constitution all around the globe, did indicate that his ruling could apply “where the United States has the degree of control over a site that would permit meaningful review” of an individual’s detention. And, he noted, the kind of control the U.S. military exercises over the Bagram detention facility is the same degree of control that it exercises “at any military base it establishes.” The one limitation he particularly stressed is that habeas might not be available if that would cause friction with a host foreign government.
The ruling cited a recent opinion by the D.C. Circuit Court (thus, as a district court judge, he was bound by it) on rejecting a push to release Chinese Muslim prisoners already found wrongly held on habeas. Release might be compelled by due process but "the due process clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States." The Supreme Court case of Zadvydas v. Davis* appears to support this, but habeas protection implies some due process, including release when wrongly detained.
Meanwhile, the Supremes handed down two rulings today. Souter had something to say in both. In United States v. Navajo Nation, he noted regret his opinion did not win out in an earlier go around, but it did not, so precedent should carry the day. He wrote a strong opinion upholding a federal rule that the police have to bring suspects in front of a magistrate within six hours of arrest if no extenuating circumstances existed. Here, he was questioned in the same building of the magistrate. The four in minority referenced Miranda (which several clearly don't like), but (cites removed):
In a world without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents would be free to question suspects for extended periods before bringing them out in the open, and we have always known what custodial secrecy leads to. No one with any smattering of the history of 20th-century dictatorships needs a lecture on the subject, and we understand the need even within our own system to take care against going too far. "[C]ustodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual," and there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed, see, e.g., Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 891, 906–907 (2004).
The problems of secrecy are not saved by post-hoc judicial hearings or loophole laden Miranda rules. It also has implications beyond this specific context. The dissent did put forth some legal realism by noting that statutory interpretation does not have a "perfect solution." The majority was not convinced by the result [including attempts at avoiding "reductio ad absurdum and the antisuperfluousness canon"] at the analysis noting in part:
The dissent cannot have it both ways. If it means to profess literalism it will have to take the absurdity that literalism brings with it; "credo quia absurdum" (as Tertullian may have said). If it will not take the absurd, then its literalism is no alternative to our reading of the statute.
The Latin means believing in absurdity or just acting on faith.
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* "It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (Fifth Amendment's protections do not extend to aliens outside the territorial boundaries); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (same). But once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."
Boumediene v. Bush only dealt with how the federal law at issue narrowed the habeas rights of detainees. The MCA also blocks treatment of detainee litigation (such as allegations of mistreatment), which is a very important matter as well. Anyway, who knows how dicta in a more narrow statutory ruling in 2001 will be used by the Supreme Court in 2009 with a lot more water under the bridge.