Griswold v. Connecticut notes:
We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights of "privacy and repose." See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 644; Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167; Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541. These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.
Breard, concerning a local ordinance against uninvited door-to-door solitications (see also, do not call registries), directly spoke of "living rights of others to privacy and repose" that helped to justify such laws. Other cases involved eavesdropping, warrantless administrative searches and sterilization ("procreation" inherently a "private" matter). The ruling also cited Boyd v. U.S., the seminal search ruling from back in 1886:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence
So, Griswold had something with which to work. The Pollak (1951) case, especially in respect to Douglas' dissent, is particularly interesting. It involved radio programs ("90% music, 5% announcements, and 5% commercial advertising") on a privately owned public utility in D.C. [The locale was notable in that Frankfurter recused himself because he found them so objectable as to not be able to neutrally decide the question!] The court below struck down the measure in effect as a form of forced speech inflicted against a captive audience*:
The passengers are known in the industry as a 'captive audience'. Formerly they were free to read, talk, meditate, or relax. The broadcasts have replaced freedom of attention with forced listening.
The Supreme Court (7-1) disagreed. The commission in question determined that such programming was beneficial. It did not involve "objectionable propaganda" [Black would oppose such use of "news, public speeches, views, or propaganda of any kind"] and was not shown to interfere "substantially with the conversation of passengers." The majority also rejected a right to privacy claim, but in telling fashion:
This position wrongly assumes that the Fifth Amendment secures to each passenger on a public vehicle regulated by the Federal Government a right of privacy substantially equal to the privacy to which he is entitled in his own home. However complete his right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited by the rights of others when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance.
One reply could be that people are forced to take public transportation, by any sensible definition of the term given the reality of the situation, so rights still are illegitimately being violated here. As the lower court noted, just because an activity might be pleasing to the majority, the rights of the minority -- even in public -- are protected in various respects. But, it should also be noted that the "right to privacy" was not just laughed out of court. It implicitly was seen as a very credible argument. In fact, "at home" it very well might be "complete."
[Consider Brandeis' famous Olmstead dissent, 1928, which was deemed correct by many legal minds of the era: "They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Note as well Justice Holmes' use of "penumbra" there.]
Sure enough this could be seen as just a matter of "accepting the argument is true but," which is fairly common. Still, the Breard case -- the volume numbers alone suggest they were decided close together -- directly spoke of rights to privacy and repose, so much that a city could limit even booksellers and campaigns of various sorts from knocking on the doors of private residences without permission. All the same, we hear claims (sometimes in harsh and/or mocking tones) that there is obviously no "right to privacy" secured by the Constitution. That it was suddenly "invented" in the 1960s on some sort of fictional ad hoc basis.
Anyways, Justice Douglas' dissent also underlines his concerns were not new when he wrote Griswold; it also underlines that "privacy" is not just about seclusion as such, but autonomy as a whole (Justice Ginsburg noted the point recently, also tying it to the 13th Amendment -- the link is not supportive, but helpfully quotes her):
If liberty is to flourish, government should never be allowed to force people to listen to any radio program. The right of privacy should include the right to pick and choose from competing entertainments, competing propaganda, competing political philosophies. If people are let alone in those choices, the right of privacy will pay dividends in character and integrity. The strength of our system is in the dignity, the resourcefulness, and the independence of our people. Our confidence is in their ability as individuals to make the wisest choice. That system cannot flourish if regimentation takes hold. The right of privacy, today violated, is a powerful deterrent to any one who would control men's minds.
Griswold was specifically about seclusion (use of contraceptives in the home was the core issue) but its recognition of a "right to privacy," one cited in earlier cases (in particular, Mapp v. Ohio, the exclusionary rule case) went much further. As Justice Harlan noted in Poe v. Ullman, such privacy was not just about place, but about all that went on there. The "home" not just property but a place where one (privately) carried out family life. The privacy was protected for a reason.
And, both the privacy and the reasons were voiced for a long time. I find it useful to remind myself (and others here etc.) of such things.
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* Justice Douglas agreed and over twenty years later was the deciding vote in upholding a law banning certain types of advertising on public transportation. [Here's another case where he support regulations that clashed with his usual concerns; cf. Justice Marshall's dissent.] His concurrence rejects the dissent's attempt to argue that visual ads are different from audio ones, which is valid up to a point, as is his forum analysis.
But, to the degree he argues privacy of the passengers is at issue, it is much weaker, especially given passengers also have to view various speech related things other passengers bring on board. The content regulation nature of the ban also is problematic if privacy is really the concern. Brennan comes off better here.