[One more thing: One theme of the book was that even when some tried (often with good intentions) to provide a sort of rights-lite approach, often defended pragmatically, it tended to be counterproductive. For instance, targeting non-citizen Japanese suggested there was a problem, one that could justify citizen Japanese if one was a bit more careful etc.]
Japanese rights groups were supportive of the same sex marriage rights in California, just as that community spoke for the habeas rights of people in Gitmo. Fred Korematsu, behind the most famous Japanese internment case, wrote a brief in support of the latter group. George Takei, best known from Star Trek, had a double reason to be supportive -- he was interned as a young child and wished to marry his long time partner. A marriage now in jeopardy. Anyway, that whole "all men are created equal" thing tends to be interconnected.
I have just finished By Order of The President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans by Greg Robinson. The book is a political and historical look at the matter, focusing on FDR's role in the whole thing. This includes long lasting distrust of the "otherness" of the Japanese, even citizens (racial limitations of citizenship from the 1790s were altered after the Civil War only as to blacks ... thus, many other groups could only become federal citizens by being born here or by select naturalization procedures), the fear of Japanese power complicating the situation. Thus, even though various people (including Hoover at the FBI) reported that the Japanese on the West Coast were loyal, FDR was predisposed to believe those who told him otherwise.
His support was furthered by racial prejudice and domestic opposition (including by Earl Warren in California, first attorney general, then governor), which also complicated ending the process when -- as early as 1943 -- it was clear that it was no longer (if ever) necessary to bar over 100,000 people, a majority citizens (the rest often elderly) from the West Coast. This was the case even though there were strong pressures from his own administration to change the policy. His Secretary of the Army (Stimson) was wary and later sorry, his Attorney General (Biddle) opposed, though both toed the line once he made his decision. Underlinings of the army were more anti-Japanese, especially the general in charge of the West Coast, as well as the Secretary of the Navy. One staid loyal into the 1980s, opposing reparations.
The book also notes that even taking the policy as acceptable as a given, FDR's prejudices and lack of concern led to unjust inaction (passionless inertia can be quite lethal), including not doing something to insure the safety of Japanese property (again, a majority here citizens), or even -- until fairly late -- informing the public that the people involved were presumptively loyal. Germans and Italians, the latter group in greater numbers on the West Coast than Japanese in many cases, were not similarly treated. Eleanor Roosevelt and others pushed for some positive treatment, and even a little bit of nice words went a long way. For instance, in Ex parte Endo, the Supremes cited FDR:
Americans of Japanese ancestry, like those of many other ancestries, have shown that they can, and want to, accept our institutions and work loyally with the rest of us, making their own valuable contribution to the national wealth and well-being. In vindication of the very ideals for which we are fighting this war it is important to us to maintain a high standard of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority as of all other minorities
Some opponents warned of negative Supreme Court treatment. Besides a lot of foot dragging and euphemisms (the first case only covered the curfew, the second the exclusion order, it being left to the dissents to note the wilful ignorance of such CYA piecemeal moves), they had nothing to worry about the mostly New Deal (and pro-war) court. The most substantive rulings only occurred after the election of 1944. The book is not concerned with the legal questions as such, but it is ironic that the cases ultimately were precedents for equality and justice. Korematsu underlined that classifications by race were suspect. Endo, which held that innocent loyal citizens could not be held (though, for the sake of argument, the opinion held they might be for short periods of time), even addressed a matter that became important in the recent Gitmo cases:
There are expressions in some of the cases which indicate that the place of confinement must be within the court's territorial jurisdiction in order to enable it to issue the writ. [cases omitted] But we are of the view that the court may act if there is a respondent within reach of its process who has custody of the petitioner.
IOW, as was held in Rasul v. Bush et. al., custody need not be in the district of the judge for whow a writ of habeas is sought. The key matter is that the person holding the person (or otherwise violating his/her rights) is within reach of the arm of the court. How this applies to non-citizens and so forth might be more complicated, but it is an important first step. One that wasn't consistently followed, but that doesn't justify the fact. It also has important bits like "Loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind not of race, creed, or color."
Endo itself, as Korematsu dissenters Murphy and Roberts (Jackson did not write a separate opinion here) noted, was another face saving opinion. One that "seems to [them] to ignore patent facts." Though accepting as a given the importance of citizenship rights and such, it ultimately held that the government here was not given the authority to confine loyal citizens in camps. As with its claim that this was purely a civilian matter, this is ridiculous. It is akin, in a fashion, to denying Congress gave President Bush the authority to invade Iraq in October 2002.
Robinson is correct that confinement without clear authorization was a further wrong, but Congress eventually funded the process, and even had repeated investigations that clearly assumed the President had clear authority to run the camps in the first place. The book overall is a worthwhile addition to the works that cover this stain on our nation, having additional cachet in that it was published in 2001. [One blurb notes "His careful study can also be read as a cautionary tale for our own 'pragmatic' times." Obama is on record as a big pragmatist.] It is a bit of a dry read at times, but still a recommended one for those looking to be educated on the subject. Something a full understanding of our history and the lessons it brings warrants.
Some rather not do that or accept just how relevant it all still is today. Ignorance is bliss, only if that is your definition of bliss.