Justice Breyer in Active Liberty summarized his "pragmatic" approach to judging, one that furthered the role of "establishing justice" (Preamble of the Constitution) via a "democracy promoting" approach. This involved interpreting statutes (he is more liable to focus on underlining principle, not bare text, including the legislative history Scalia scorns) and constitutional provisions. The latter he approaches by being concerned by underlining principles, seen through the test of time. Here's a more extensive review. But, here's a quote that gives you a taste of his approach:
[Judges] read the text’s language along with related language in other parts of the document. They take account of its history, including history that shows what the language likely meant to those who wrote it. They look to tradition indicating how the relevant language was, and is, used in the law. They examine precedents interpreting the phrase, holding or suggesting what the phrase means and how it has been applied. They try to understand the phrase’s purposes or (in respect to many constitutional phrases) the values that it embodies, and they consider the likely consequences of the interpretive alternatives, valued in terms of the phrase’s purposes.
Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View is more focused on one group's part in all of this, the courts, hoping to explain a way to do it well and in a way deemed legitimate by the people overall. He comes off to this reader as an ideal teacher and judge, polite and fair, humble and wise, someone you can trust with the great responsibility given to federal judges.* As pretty good review (I use qualifiers like that or "apparently" in a way he sometimes does -- I hedge because it is not a white/black thing, it is a judgment call, that often is a matter of "as a whole") notes:
It's thus a bit surprising — and refreshing — to have a sitting member of the court produce a book examining its work. And yet, Justice Stephen Breyer has written not one but two illuminating treatises that thoughtfully place the court in the larger context of American democracy. His latest, "Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View," extends his public ruminations with what are becoming his hallmarks: wisdom, modesty, incisiveness and a touch of naiveté.
Breyer begins by discussing the concept of judicial review and a few key moments (Marbury, the Cherokees, Dred Scott, Little Rock, 2000) in its history, showing himself as an "engaging storyteller, presenting those episodes with a light pen, illuminating the constitutional issues deftly." The Cherokees and Little Rock cases are told particularly well, including a few tidbits (such as the moderate nature of the school board) that many probably don't know. Some details are left out -- I continue to think it artificial to discuss Marbury without showing how judicial review was practiced beforehand -- but overall these are helpful snapshots.
He then explains how a judge can write "decisions that work" (counseling readers to first read a very good summary he provides about how the federal courts operate) in areas like interpreting statutes or administration rulings. This is a bit more technical but his focus on "purposes and consequences" (or "values" and "proportionality" when dealing with individual liberties) is on the whole readable for the average reader, for whom this book is geared. Again, Justice Breyer is humble here. He gives great responsibility to judges, but doesn't promise perfection. Sometimes, I think he is wrong (often using his own criteria; for instance, at worse, his dissent, not the "giving nothing" dissent of Stevens in Heller, which he joined, is the more pragmatic approach). Purpose also seems a bit too open-ended at times.
But, overall, his approach is at worse quite useful. For instance, the last two chapters contrasts the total discretion of Korematsu with the more balanced approach of the detainee cases. For some reason, he leaves out the more troubling Padilla case. Still, the comparison suggests how judicial review can promote democratic ends, democracy as understood by our system, having an independent role that still respects its limitations and the other institutions involved. This humble but assured within its proper zone approach is a good model to follow and probably has implications for other branches as well.
He finishes with "hope" that the book will help people to understand our constitutional system better and lead them to ponder it some. "That is why I have written this book." It's appreciated.
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* When I referenced this book earlier, a link is provided to a blog post talking about the book in which I had various comments. Some regarded my belief, to me somewhat strangely questioned by Prof. Orin Kerr as if what I was saying was news to him, that Justice Scalia too often promotes a stereotypical view of his beliefs. A view that I later noted had an unpleasant edge that even led more than one of his colleagues to publicly note their disappointment. See also, here.
This doesn't mean Breyer is perfect or sometimes doesn't do something that annoys. Or, that Scalia is simply a tool. As I said, honestly, I respect Scalia for putting his (quite intelligent) views out there and challenging (with enjoyment) the views of others. This works better than Kennedy not deigning to respond to some comments made by the dissent. But, as the last link suggests, there isn't just a certain unpleasant edge to Scalia's comments. They have a certain faux nature, often a result of what comes off as intellectual laziness mixed with snotty assurance.
Breyer is pretty sure of his views, you have to be to be a Breyer justice ("activist" in the sense of actively doing the job of a judge), but he mixes in some humility. The fact he is making a value choice, one not somehow compelled by history or text, can be readily admitted, since as a human judge that is the only alternative. Scalia needs to use legal fiction but can't bring himself to admit it, since it would "ruin it" by letting the subjective cat out the bag.