The end of the term is approaching, but there was some degree of unity in the cases handed down today. There were some interesting splits, generally in reasoning, that will be the focus today.
In the one case where there was a full 5-4 split, ruling on the issue if there is "a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings" [update: or, if not, what is necessary] in certain cases. Roberts/Alito didn't join the section of Thomas' dissent [on why his ethic issues aren't the same as Fortas', see my comments here] that rests on original understanding. They also didn't join a section that was concerned that the majority opinion's balancing test "does not account for the interests of the child and custodial parent." The majority did cite "any countervailing interest" factored in the analysis. It isn't clear how important this matter was to the ruling and Roberts/Alito very well could have thought it unnecessary to deal with the point.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that class in a major Wal-Mart gender discrimination suit should not have been certified, though four (via Ginsburg) would have done more to leave open an alternative route. This case has received a decent amount of press (see, e.g., Slate or Democracy Now!), but it is not really that surprising that the broad claim that tried to bring in so many people failed. As with some other rulings this term, some will find this a very troubling development, but not sure how bad it is, long term. Devil in details.
An attempt to use the federal courts to bring broad environmental claims that the EPA would logically handle was rejected, not surprisingly. Sotomayor recused (it was from her old circuit), the Court was split on standing, the lower court upheld by an evenly divided court. On the merits, Alito/Thomas felt obligated to remind people they disagreed with an earlier ruling, but since each side assumed its legitimacy, they would go along with the majority. I find such a thing a tad bit gratuitous but it is a way for justices to continue not to respect precedent they find particularly wrong in some fashion.
Kennedy wrote an interesting Petition Clause case that unanimously (Scalia and Thomas not agreeing with all the reasoning) rejecting the claim because a public employee was involved and the petition was not a matter of public concern. Scalia didn't want to accept that the clause applies to petitioning the courts, noting the matter was only cited in dicta (one case written by Justice Douglas, singled out by name, which is um interesting) . Thomas said he basically agreed with Scalia's comments but brought up some other reason to rule as the majority did, yet again figuring out some idiosyncratic reasoning ala Stevens might.
Scalia's opinion has more than one interesting bit of reasoning that comes off as assumptions. For instance, "a pre-existing individual right" like this one "means that we must look to historical practice to determine its scope." Is the rule different for other constitutional rights? Why? Also, when is "core" aspects not the right question (possible hint: when you aren't writing a compromise majority opinion?)? Scalia honestly notes that various scholars have refuted his stance on petitioning courts. This only reaffirms the limits of "original understanding." He also thinks saying the clause largely deals with "personal grievances" undersells things, but as the majority notes, many petitions (e.g., against slavery) were quite "public" in scope.
Scalia actually dissented in part. I don't think "there should be no doctrinal distinction between them unless the history or tradition of the Petition Clause justifies it" (when the text doesn't clearly compel) is the reason, but am inclined to agree that a "public concern" limit to bring claims very well might be a problem. But, the partial opening Scalia would allow in this case is barely discussed and not really taken too seriously. It is basically since the other side didn't bother to dispute it. So, I don't know how much value it really provides at the end of the day.
A few big cases, including involving video games, forthcoming.
In the one case where there was a full 5-4 split, ruling on the issue if there is "a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings" [update: or, if not, what is necessary] in certain cases. Roberts/Alito didn't join the section of Thomas' dissent [on why his ethic issues aren't the same as Fortas', see my comments here] that rests on original understanding. They also didn't join a section that was concerned that the majority opinion's balancing test "does not account for the interests of the child and custodial parent." The majority did cite "any countervailing interest" factored in the analysis. It isn't clear how important this matter was to the ruling and Roberts/Alito very well could have thought it unnecessary to deal with the point.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that class in a major Wal-Mart gender discrimination suit should not have been certified, though four (via Ginsburg) would have done more to leave open an alternative route. This case has received a decent amount of press (see, e.g., Slate or Democracy Now!), but it is not really that surprising that the broad claim that tried to bring in so many people failed. As with some other rulings this term, some will find this a very troubling development, but not sure how bad it is, long term. Devil in details.
An attempt to use the federal courts to bring broad environmental claims that the EPA would logically handle was rejected, not surprisingly. Sotomayor recused (it was from her old circuit), the Court was split on standing, the lower court upheld by an evenly divided court. On the merits, Alito/Thomas felt obligated to remind people they disagreed with an earlier ruling, but since each side assumed its legitimacy, they would go along with the majority. I find such a thing a tad bit gratuitous but it is a way for justices to continue not to respect precedent they find particularly wrong in some fashion.
Kennedy wrote an interesting Petition Clause case that unanimously (Scalia and Thomas not agreeing with all the reasoning) rejecting the claim because a public employee was involved and the petition was not a matter of public concern. Scalia didn't want to accept that the clause applies to petitioning the courts, noting the matter was only cited in dicta (one case written by Justice Douglas, singled out by name, which is um interesting) . Thomas said he basically agreed with Scalia's comments but brought up some other reason to rule as the majority did, yet again figuring out some idiosyncratic reasoning ala Stevens might.
Scalia's opinion has more than one interesting bit of reasoning that comes off as assumptions. For instance, "a pre-existing individual right" like this one "means that we must look to historical practice to determine its scope." Is the rule different for other constitutional rights? Why? Also, when is "core" aspects not the right question (possible hint: when you aren't writing a compromise majority opinion?)? Scalia honestly notes that various scholars have refuted his stance on petitioning courts. This only reaffirms the limits of "original understanding." He also thinks saying the clause largely deals with "personal grievances" undersells things, but as the majority notes, many petitions (e.g., against slavery) were quite "public" in scope.
Scalia actually dissented in part. I don't think "there should be no doctrinal distinction between them unless the history or tradition of the Petition Clause justifies it" (when the text doesn't clearly compel) is the reason, but am inclined to agree that a "public concern" limit to bring claims very well might be a problem. But, the partial opening Scalia would allow in this case is barely discussed and not really taken too seriously. It is basically since the other side didn't bother to dispute it. So, I don't know how much value it really provides at the end of the day.
A few big cases, including involving video games, forthcoming.