
Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand aka "Supermom," number 3 on The Hill's Beautiful People list, top among actual members of Congress. She's cute, but not sure how she beats six and ten. Pic from here. She's also not a a bad senator either.
Various thoughts on current events with an emphasis on politics, legal issues, books, movies and whatever is on my mind. Emails can be sent to almostsanejoe@aol.com; please put "blog comments" in the subject line.
What supporters of the law are really arguing is “if the federal government refuses to enforce its own laws, including for sensitive reasons of foreign policy, the Constitution permits the states to step in and override the federal enforcement choices rather than restricting the remedy to impeachment of the President or removal via the electoral process”. And there’s no reason to think that THIS is the case.
It’s stunning that anyone is attempting to claim the Supremacy clause only concerns ‘law’ and not ‘policy’. The job of executing the law is given to the President — Art II §2. Without someone putting it into effect a law is just a piece of paper or letters on a screen. If the Supremacy clause did apply only to the law in theory or States were free to interpret it themselves then any State could apply their own interpretation of it, claim it wasn’t being executed properly and do it themselves, making a mockery of any kind of organised system of laws in the country. In order for federalism to actually mean anything there has the federal Executive has to decide how to execute the laws that Congress pass and those laws and decisions have to override inconsistent actions of the States. Reading the Constitution in the way suggested by some results in absurdity. ....
It would be ludicrous if a State could pass a law, as Arizona has done, which appears to conform to federal law, but actually attempts to enforce that law in its own way, with additional penalties, or with skewed priorities.
1. I think that the status quo on immigration is a tacit compromise between business interests, the Mexican government, and Hispanic groups on the one hand and labor unions and nativist groups on the other, and that the Constitution permits such tacit compromises. It in no way dishonors his oath of office; however, if it did, the remedy is to impeach.
2. The President “refuses to enforce US law” all the time, if you mean exercises his discretion (through the Justice Department and administrative agencies) to decline to prosecute or bring enforcement actions against people or entities who violate it. Again, though, if in a particular case this seems improper, the remedy is impeachment. [Still, not bloody likely to occur.]
3. I don’t think letting illegal immigrants stay in the country in any way makes the US less sovereign. What sovereign is challenging us over any significant amount of our territory? What people don’t recognize the US as sovereign? What sovereign immunity has the US lost? This is overheated political rhetoric from anti-immigrant conservatives. Plenty of countries (1) have illegal immigration problems and (2) retain sovereignty.
4. As I said, Mexico obviously isn’t going to invade. But Mexican cooperation is crucial on several foreign policy issues, including terrorism, drug trafficking, free trade, hemispheric cooperation, and, yes, controlling migrant flows. If the President determines that the best way to secure such cooperation is not to be draconian in enforcement of immigration law, that is precisely the type of foreign policy judgment that it is his right to make. The Constitution doesn’t grant the 50 states the power to make 50 junior foreign policies that conflict with Presidential determinations, or to blithely declare that whatever actions they take that piss a neighbor off actually have no effect on foreign policy.
It requires no novel or strained interpretation of the Commerce Clause to sustain Title II as applied in either of these cases. At least since Gibbons v. Ogden, decided in 1824 in an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall, it has been uniformly accepted that the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States is plenary, "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Nor is "Commerce" as used in the Commerce Clause to be limited to a narrow, technical concept. It includes not only, as Congress has enumerated in the Act, "travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication," but also all other unitary transactions and activities that take place in more States than one. That some parts or segments of such unitary transactions may take place only in one State cannot, of course, take from Congress its plenary power to regulate them in the national interest. The facilities and instrumentalities used to carry on this commerce, such as railroads, truck lines ships, rivers, and even highways, are also subject to congressional regulation so far as is necessary to keep interstate traffic upon fair and equal terms.
Furthermore, it has long been held that the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, adds to the commerce power of Congress the power to regulate local instrumentalities operating within a single State if their activities burden the flow of commerce among the States. ....
But, in deciding the constitutional power of Congress in cases like the two before us, we do not consider the effect on interstate commerce of only one isolated, individual, local event, without regard to the fact that this single local event, when added to many others of a similar nature, may impose a burden on interstate commerce by reducing its volume or distorting its flow. ....
"The genius and character of the whole government seem to be that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally, but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some of the General powers of the Government." Gibbons v. Ogden.
"She didn't overturn the law," said Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), the second highest ranking Republican in the Senate. "She said that portions of it -- the bulk of it -- needed to be enjoined because of her view that it was pre-empted by federal law because it created undue additional burdens on the federal government. This judge is not an activist judge. She had to make a decision. She made a decision. I don't happen to agree with it, but she's not an activist." ...
"I don't know if it's so much judicial activism as it is a failure to understand the federal government's responsibility when they don't carry out their responsibility then the states have to do it for themselves as a matter of security," said Sen. John McCain (R-AZ).
Lots of stuff, it seems. The perils of being weak-kneed and knee-jerk in particular, especially when people with stated desires to destroy the left [as a clip on Jon Stewart showed], even if it requires fraudulently edited video to do it. Fool me once .... Did not we learn from the ACORN debacle, shown to be filled with crap as well?
But, the strength and insight of the woman herself was inspiring, especially those who learn about her life story. In a different context, Sherrod (and the white farmers who spoke out for her -- farmers who some might at first glance stereotypically say look like those likely to be racists) sounds like someone President Obama would provide as a symbol.
The story also brought to light a little known federal lawsuit:
Five months after President Obama announced a $1.25 billion settlement for black farmers who faced overt discrimination by the USDA in the eighties and nineties -- and several days after the Sherrod case brought the issue up again -- Congress again refused to authorize the money.
A "settlement" underlines that the courts aren't the only place we go to obtain justice. It also shows that even after discrimination is found, it takes the other branches to deal with the situation, which has not been fully accomplished -- this thing has been going on since the 1990s -- here.
Those who have read/listened to more than a couple minutes of her speech also learned a bit about the history of racism on the ground. Again, Sherrod knows something about that given her father (a black farmer) was killed by a white person when she was a girl, the grand jury refused to indict. It helped her decide to stay and work for justice; it is in that context that she then noted that eventually she learned it is about helping poor people of all races. It is something like if someone was raped, pledges to work for the rights of women, but finds out some college frat boy had his rights violated by the policies of the college and -- though she isn't really interested at first -- helps him.
Sherrod also spoke about the history of law enforcement in the state, including two racists sheriffs, one the subject of a major civil rights case back in the 1940s.* We too often forget that such perversion of the role of the government was not that long ago, putting aside that it still occurs in certain contexts to this day. This led to some discussion of lynching, including historical attempts (in part blocked by filibustering) to address it on the federal level. As the links suggest, this led to some attempts to call her a "liar" or the like for her use of the term "lynch," but also that (as with her treatment as a whole) even some natural critics (including people at American Spectator) think the people went too far here.
Does that mean the likes of Andrew Breitbart will be shown as persona non grata by them? It is a long process -- doesn't take too many dissenters, as shown by Republicans for Obama in '08, for some progress to be made. Anyways, hopefully some lessons will be learned here.
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* The SC was closely divided in part because the use of federal civil rights laws were still fairly novel; the opinion started:
This case involves a shocking and revolting episode in law enforcement. Petitioner Screws was sheriff of Baker County, Georgia. He enlisted the assistance of petitioner Jones, a policeman, and petitioner Kelley, a special deputy, in arresting Robert Hall, a citizen of the United States and of Georgia. The arrest was made late at night at Hall's home on a warrant charging Hall with theft of a tire. Hall, a young negro about thirty years of age, was handcuffed and taken by car to the court house. As Hall alighted from the car at the court house square, the three petitioners began beating him with their fists and with a solid-bar blackjack about eight inches long and weighing two pounds. They claimed Hall had reached for a gun and had used insulting language as he alighted from the [325 U.S. 91, 93] car. But after Hall, still handcuffed, had been knocked to the ground they continued to beat him from fifteen to thirty minutes until he was unconscious. Hall was then dragged feet first through the court house yard into the jail and thrown upon the floor dying. An ambulance was called and Hall was removed to a hospital where he died within the hour and without regaining consciousness. There was evidence that Screws held a grudge against Hall and had threatened to 'get' him.
For one, Catholics, who unlike Protestants believe in purgatory, think prayer helps speed the transition from limbo to heaven.
Under that logic, when a Christian prays for someone who has died, he is also praying for himself. He therefore brings himself closer to God and closer to salvation.
I should suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.
Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public questions, there should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate.
Who would have thought those would be the last hits and runs the Mets would get for the final seven innings? Anyone who watched Wednesday’s game.
"This is when it hits home. This is when those men in the locker room realize this is for real, we're awful," Ojeda said. "We're going through the motions. We face the worst bullpen in history and manage one hit."
The post Estrada hope[d] to fill is vacant because Republicans blocked action on two Clinton picks for the court: Washington attorney Allen Snyder and Harvard law professor Elena Kagan.Yes, President Clinton nominated Kagan for the appellate bench in '99, but she was never given a hearing. Synder was, but his nominated languished too, even given (to quote Wikipedia) "his support from conservatives like Rehnquist, Sen. John Warner, and former appeals court judge Robert Bork." Estrada, as was the case of others, had a shot because of Republican obstruction of an "up or down" vote.*
Exhaustively researched and documented, it explains how over the past several decades mercenary scientists have partnered with tobacco companies and chemical corporations to help them convince the public that their products are safe – even when solid science proves otherwise.
In other words, the actual Oklahoma law -- and the hypothetical law that bans outright the disclosure of fetal abnormalities -- do not have the effect of pressuring or forcing a pregnant woman to continue a pregnancy against her will. What these laws do, instead, is to limit the options of women who want to remain pregnant, but only on the condition that their babies will be born normal.
If one were to consider the fetus the equal of a newborn baby, then it would seem to follow that a woman considering whether or not to remain pregnant generally would not be entitled to find out that her fetus suffers from an anomaly. In other words, once a baby is at issue, the woman can no longer claim the right to obtain information that would facilitate a decision to kill the baby because he suffers from Down Syndrome or some other anomaly.
For someone who believes that a fetus is morally distinct from a baby, and that the right to abortion is at least in part about deciding which children one wants to have or avoid having, the law requires us to confront our own prejudices and to ask ourselves whether a genetically-impaired future is truly worse than no future at all.
The solution the Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks.
This question [cited above] is not an easy one to answer, but the Oklahoma statute effectively raises it, without confounding the issue with bodily-integrity concerns in the way that a direct restriction on abortions for "bad reasons" would. Thus, whether intentionally or not, this law cleanly presents the questions whether and when there is a right to discriminate on the basis of disability in the unique context of procreation.
On one level the “Family Guy” producers understand that some of their jokes — a scene in which Lois is impregnated by Peruvian natives wielding blow-dart guns; a lengthy Warner Brothers parody in which Peter stalks Lois with an Acme Miscarriage Kit — may not have treated the abortion debate with proper gravity.
In Mohammed’s case, District Judge Kessler at one point ordered a high government official, Daniel Fried, to appear in her courtroom and, under oath, submit to questioning about his assurances that detainees would not be mistreated in countries to which they were sent. That part of her order, too, was summarily reversed by the Circuit Court.
A five-year investigation by the Justice Department’s ethics office sharply criticized the memorandums and found, in a report disclosed this year, that the two men had committed “professional misconduct.” But that finding was rejected by David Margolis, a career lawyer at the Justice Department who made a final ruling on the ethics review. Mr. Margolis said the work of Judge Bybee and Mr. Yoo had “significant flaws,” but said that any assessment should consider the climate of fear and urgency after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Various Second Amendment issues are already being decided by the lower courts:
Steven Skoien has two convictions for “misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence” and therefore is forbidden to carry firearms in or affecting interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9). Wisconsin informed Skoien about this rule; he signed an acknowledgment of the firearms disability.
The provision was upheld by a 2-1 vote, the dissent wishing to remand the issue to the district court basically for more factual analysis and a determination if non-felons are truly not protected. The majority held that this statute fit within one of the exceptions cited by the Supreme Court in Heller as a type of provision that the ruling should not be assumed to override. That is, gun ownership by those convicted of a crime, or more specifically, a class of people specifically likely to cause "armed mayhem." Cf. Martha Stewart with this offender.
Heller's citation of "felons" and other categories in conclusionary dicta however doesn't conclusively decide the issue. And, the number of non-violent felonies alone suggest some need for clarity. Should some tax offender be denied the right to have a firearm at home for self defense? OTOH, released felons are denied voting and other rights, including having less privacy from home visits and so forth. How about someone who was in some sort of mental institution some time back for some eating disorder? Are they now mentally ill and able to be denied a right to own a firearm? What should be the basis of determining such things?
For the category where limitations were left open, factual data is relevant:
Both logic and data establish a substantial relation between §922(g)(9) and this objective.
And, the ruling cited such data. The dissent accepted that up to a point, except where the 2A categorically bars that -- for instance, if non-felons are protected, the choice is made constitutionally, not by use of scientific data. One problem, inviting some questionable rulings, is that the Supreme Court did not clarify how the lower courts should rule in this area. A historically commonly accepted firearm at home is one thing, but there are lots of situations where the answer is unclear. As with other areas, the rulings are facially broad, but in many ways quite shallow.
Ditto giving rights to detainees in Gitmo, but leaving to lower courts the power to determine that exactly that means, often without too many people paying much attention.
It may be understandable that she said little after White House coaching and the continuing success of stonewalling nominees. But it is regrettable.
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
Islam has one of the earliest versions of capital redistribution of wealth. It is called Zakaat and it is compulsory for every Muslim.
The tax is levied as 1/40th per annum of one’s capital, excluding such items as one’s primary home, car and professional tools. In Islamic states, Zaakat is paid to a Zaakat Authority which uses it for charitable purposes.
Individual charity is, of course, also encouraged, preferably in secret. Among relevant hadith (sayings of the Prophet):-
"Charity is a necessity for every Muslim." He was asked: "What if a person has nothing?" The Prophet replied: "He should work with his own hands for his benefit and then give something out of such earnings in charity." The Companions of the Prophet asked: "What if he is not able to work?" The Prophet said: "He should help the poor and needy." The Companions further asked: "What if he cannot do even that?" The Prophet said: "He should urge others to do good." The Companions said: "What if he lacks that also?" The Prophet said: "He should check himself from doing evil. That is also an act of charity."
Further, pious Muslims have since the earliest times endowed hospitals and institutions of learning by the establishment of waqfs or trusts. In Islamic jurisprudence waqf is the detention of specific thing in the ownership of waqif and the devoting of its profit or products "in charity of for the relief of the poor or other good objects"
By the 11th century, every Islamic city had hospitals supported by waqf trusts as well as schools and higher educational institutes. Many such trusts exist today.
Bart should remember that an important principle of Islamic theology is that everything belongs to God, and that wealth is therefore held by human beings in trust.
U.S. District Court Judge Joseph Tauro, appointed to the federal bench in 1972, ruled this afternoon in Gill v. Office of Personnel Management that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A companion decision in Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services also was issued, with Tauro finding that DOMA also violates the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause of the Constitution.
As one of the rulings noted on study determined that there are "1,138 federal laws tied benefits, protections, rights, or responsibilities to marital status," benefits that will not be secured by state action alone, be it "marriage" or "civil union." [GAO report] The issue in one case were federal health benefits, social security benefits and the ability to file taxes jointly.
The Obama Administration had a tricky time with these cases, since he is after all on record being against DOMA, and in support of broad civil union benefits for same sex couples. For instance, the court here says that the rationales stated by Congress were rejected:
(1) encouraging responsible procreation and child-bearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage, (3) defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources
Reasonably so, since the arguments are shown here to be lame, as they have been [but as with making fun of a lesbian's looks or assume some neutral clothing regulation is involved, they keep on being tossed around as if they are not; see some ugly comments to this article] repeatedly. This includes the fact that "same-sex marriages by all fifty states would actually result in a net increase in federal revenue." The Administration was left with defending the "status quo." But, the judge will not let them get away with that either, particularly:
Importantly, the passage of DOMA marks the first time that the federal government has ever attempted to legislatively mandate a uniform federal definition of marriage–or any other core concept of domestic relations, for that matter.
Marriage changed greatly over the years in a great number of ways, and in no way consistently, but such a federal limitation was not put in place to "slow things down," even when the changes came -- as is the case here, since same sex marriage is available in the U.S. both via court and legislative action -- via court process. In fact, in a companion case -- brought by the state -- the Tenth Amendment was invoked. In the MA case, the state sued to obtain "spousal" federal veteran burial funds and health related funds [millions of dollars in total] blocked by DOMA.
[As I note here, if the feds want to retain the status quo and not get bogged down in the conflict, this is a somewhat irrational way of doing so, given it goes out of the way to do just that. Meanwhile, here's a good analysis of the rulings from a new favorite blog. Some time ago, I referenced a tidbit about "general" laws that was not addressed here, but seems to me relevant here.]
The court holds that the fund limitation violations equal protection. But, likewise, marriage is a specifically state function, and the federal government could not single out one type of marriage for disfavor in this fashion. Interracial marriage was not back in the day, and history suggests doing so here would be unique as well. The judge was appointed by Nixon, so such federalism and history based arguments very well might be more appealing to him. Don't know how they will fare on review, but it does underline there is a conservative aspect to this case.
DOMA was specifically set in place to stop the mandated recognition of out of state same sex marriages, but a troubling rider was brought with it -- even if a state legislature (as has occurred a few times already, putting aside D.C.) by majority rule recognizes same sex marriage, the federal government will single out them for denial of over 1000 benefits. Meanwhile, first cousins can marry and in theory (as actually occurred once) a religiously based marriage between an uncle and niece can be allowed as well. Even race -- including in the 1950s -- did not lead to that animus.
This ruling, which might or might not stand, is justified on both equal protection and federalism grounds. Though the reasoning can be applied to overturn DOMA completely, the other aspect -- letting states not recognize out of state marriages -- is at least less irrational on federalism grounds. The rulings have a strong federalism component, so are not completely applicable to a state same sex case (or marriages in federal territories), where control over marriage is somewhat different.1. Some states having one abortion clinic
2. People in the military, prisons and so forth not being able to get access
3. Lack of funding, even for those who require expensive abortions for health or in respect to a dead fetus inside of them (or one that won't survive birth)
4. Teen notification/consent laws that provide judicial outs to deal with anti-abortion parents via some complex obstacle courses, sometimes infused with religious teaching
5. Limits on a particular procedure that for a few women might be needed to protect their health and/or ability to have children in the future
6. Abortion doctors and clinics under siege, including the one the state has access to
7. Morning after pill supply being threatened, including by rape victims brought to Catholic hospitals; in fact, access to contraceptives overall is threatened, not only for minors, but via lack of coverage (while Viagra is covered)
8. Any number of abortion specific burdensome regulations to complicate and make abortions more expensive or make it a harder procedure for women, such as forced ultrasounds
9. Deprivation of funding to inner city clinics that even talk about abortion or overseas family planning where abortion is some small aspect of its services
10. Any number of non-legal issues, such as non-coverage of abortion in film/t.v., failure to note choice is not a one way street in religious faiths etc.
On a day when it hit a record 103 degrees in the city, Santana steamed around the bases after capping a tenacious 12-pitch at-bat with his drive off the right-field foul screen.
All of us should be embarrassed that a sentence written by a White House aide now stands enshrined in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, erroneously credited with scientific authorship and rigor. Kagan should be most chastened of all. She fooled the nation's highest judges. As one of them, she had better make sure they aren't fooled again.
With one exception, the federal trial courts that have heard expert evidence on the matter have reached similar factual conclusions.
not because the procedure kills the fetus, not because it risks worse complications for the woman than alternative procedures would do, not because it is a crueler or more painful or more disgusting method of terminating a pregnancy.
We cannot, however, read the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists panel’s qualification (that it could not “identify” a circumstance where D&X was the “only” life- or health-preserving option) as if, according to Nebraska’s argument (8), it denied the potential health-related need for D&X. That is because the College writes the following in its amici brief:
“Depending on the physician’s skill and experience, the D&X procedure can be the most appropriate abortion procedure for some women in some circumstances. D&X presents a variety of potential safety advantages over other abortion procedures used during the same gestational period. Compared to D&Es involving dismemberment, D&X involves less risk of uterine perforation or cervical laceration because it requires the physician to make fewer passes into the uterus with sharp instruments and reduces the presence of sharp fetal bone fragments that can injure the uterus and cervix. There is also considerable evidence that D&X reduces the risk of retained fetal tissue, a serious abortion complication that can cause maternal death, and that D&X reduces the incidence of a ‘free floating’ fetal head that can be difficult for a physician to grasp and remove and can thus cause maternal injury. That D&X procedures usually take less time than other abortion methods used at a comparable stage of pregnancy can also have health advantages. The shorter the procedure, the less blood loss, trauma, and exposure to anesthesia. The intuitive safety advantages of intact D&E are supported by clinical experience. Especially for women with particular health conditions, there is medical evidence that D&X may be safer than available alternatives.” Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 21—22 (citation and footnotes omitted).