excuse me what https://t.co/pOoBpVvEaI
— Molly Knight (@molly_knight) December 29, 2019
Trump is trying to out the alleged Ukraine whistleblower on Twitter.Some will not take someone that even the likes of the head guy at liberal leaning Dorf on Law has dismissed to me personally as a kneejerk types a good judge. But, when it comes to how bad Trump is, that level of disgusted cynical partisan (though repeatedly he still leaves something to be desired) is appropriate.
"Facebook has a policy against naming the whistleblower, and told BuzzFeed News on Thursday that any mention of the name of the person believed to be the whistleblower violates its coordinating harm policy."Even with Andrew Johnson, when a Johnson even campaigning itself was notable and there was a higher degree of propriety regarding public speech, there was not enough support to even bring it to a vote. But, Trump at some point makes Johnson's "Swing Around the Circle" rhetoric tame, particularly given the reach of his Twitter. Calling Comey "scum" is notable enough. [See Aaron Ruper Twitter.] No wonder serious splits among evangelists (note it always was much more "white" evangelists anyhow, a qualifier notable in its absence) are starting to come out. This guy is in the minds of many after all the President of the United States. But, retweeting the supposed whistleblower?
Mr. Biden was asked by The Register whether he stood by previous comments that he would not comply with a subpoena to testify in the impeachment trial. He said he did, and explained that complying with a subpoena and testifying would effectively allow Mr. Trump to shift attention onto Mr. Biden and away from the president’s own conduct. Mr. Biden made similar comments to reporters aboard his campaign bus on Friday night.While the idea of witnesses called on behalf of the Senate, or at the request of the House of Representatives in the form of managers putting on a case, is put out there, this latest Biden thing to me didn't help. Biden is obviously right that there really is no good reason for Biden to be subpoenaed as a whole and it is likely just a way for Trump/Republicans to throw smoke. OTOH, I'm not sure how unlike that is as compared to many witnesses called in various civil and criminal trials. And, the rules are more lax in impeachment trials. Biden had no grounds to say that.
Hanukkah this year runs from the evenings of the 22nd until 30th. I again provide this past discussion (and later versions on this blog) and [still] wish to find a good book that provides the surrounding history for the general reader. Both the immediate Maccabees revolt and developing holiday. The Slate article was written by a Jewish scholar who co-officiated Chelsea Clinton's wedding some years afterwards. Happy Festivus (today) as well.
The Pelosi moment pic.twitter.com/dfqzuiicpN
— Jennifer Epstein (@jeneps) December 19, 2019
Hallmark said it would be "working with GLAAD to better represent the LGBTQ community across our portfolio of brands" and "reaching out to Zola to reestablish our partnership and reinstate the commercials."Great news. The network is by nature conservative though it doesn't lay it on thick as seen by the typical movie ending with the leads kissing. There is a charming older (2011) film entitled Trading Christmas with one of the two couples (the woman is played by Faith Ford and is quite good; she is a widow) actually making out during the film and regular views have a reason to be shocked at the whole thing.
In an opinion that began with the obvious quote from Anatole France, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bars a city from prosecuting people criminally for sleeping outside on public property when they have no home or other shelter to go to.Looking, it was written by and joined by two "controversial" 9CA judges with a "look at us" dissent when en banc review was denied. The case, after extended procedural discussions, basically rely on a 1960s duo of cases that barred prosecuting drug addiction but allowing it for public drunkenness. The first is a condition that could not be avoided and here without the means, so is public homelessness. A related case was decided there in the past. The Supreme Court has basically underenforced the provision in question, the cases basically all capital punishment in nature or involving minors (no mandatory LWOP) or prison conditions. ONCE it held a non-capital LWOP punishment (and that 5-4) as unconstitutional. It also had limited cases involving fines.
public’s interest in the Committee’s efforts relating to election integrity, national security, money laundering, and foreign blackmail were “of the highest order” and outweighed Applicants’ personal interest in “nondisclosure of financial documents concerning their businesses.”Again, yes, it's reasonable (though far from too pessimistic to think otherwise) to think that the ultimate result here is some sort of win to sanity involving the extreme executive power claims raised here. But, extremists have an upper hand on some level, since they ask for so much that even getting some (including more and more time) things is enough to worry. This is a part of a wider whole too. While Trump is obstructing Congress, electoral security legislation is being held up in the Senate. One reckons at some point some sort of thing will be passed, but what it will entail is unclear. And, some want the House to delay more, have more litigation, instead of impeaching. The fear it will be unpopular is dubious. And, it has various positive effects too.
In 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government cannot require recipients of funds to fight HIV and AIDS to have policies expressly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking. Today, in U.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether the government can apply that policy to foreign affiliates of U.S.-based groups. Justice Elena Kagan is recused from the case.Orders are due on Monday and I'll comment then.
"It would be a travesty to take away his life when he is the epitome of what a changed man looks like," reads one of the 29 letters included in a clemency petition submitted to the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles on Nov. 13 by Travis Runnels' attorneys. They ask that Runnels' execution, scheduled for Dec. 11, be halted and his sentence commuted to life in prison. The letters come from friends and family members scattered across the U.S. and Europe and describe him as "repentant," "reformed," "loving," and, especially, "changed."This is one of those "worse of the worst" scenarios: murder in prison. But, even here, over fifteen years later (if medium-range as far as these things go), there are concerns. The forty-something murderer here is argued to have changed, which occurs even for murderers though even granting this redemption might only get you so much. Perhaps, it serves justice and his own morality good to find some sort of peace before getting "just deserts" for his crimes. Someone angry at his work detail or even the usual pettiness of employers (inside and outside at times occurring in seriously bad ways though it's unclear how much of that was here) murdering someone in prison, an inmate already with behavior problems there, is not an ideal suspect here.
No one would have used those words to describe Runnels on Jan. 29, 2003, when he was several years into a 70-year sentence for armed robbery. That morning, on the way to his shift at the boot factory in the Clements Unit near Amarillo, Runnels told a fellow inmate he was going to kill his supervisor, Stanley Wiley. Arriving at the factory, Runnels took a knife used for trimming leather, slipped up behind Wiley, and slit his throat. As Wiley bled to death, an inmate asked Runnels why he'd done it. "It could have been any offender or inmate, you know, as long as they was white," Runnels replied.
President Trump plans to sign an executive order Wednesday that defines the Jewish people as a nationality for purposes of federal civil rights law, an effort to step up enforcement against episodes of anti-Semitism on college campuses, two administration officials said.This news resulted in an uproar suggested by some of the comments at this blog (the NYT article that first announced it is linked there). The main post highlights the concern that it will interfere with free speech. As the NYT article (both articles are helpful to provide context, so I link both) notes:
The order will effectively interpret Judaism as a race or nationality, not just a religion, to prompt a federal law penalizing colleges and universities deemed to be shirking their responsibility to foster an open climate for minority students. In recent years, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions — or B.D.S. — movement against Israel has roiled some campuses, leaving some Jewish students feeling unwelcome or attacked.Just to toss it out there, the Education Department already broadly interprets the rules here, so (as is usual with these executive orders from the Trump White House) the true reach, apart from symbolism, of the order is unclear. Anyway, there really is antisemitism out there (or discrimination against Jews, for those who want to generally coyly say others are Semites), but at universities specifically, there is a lot more baggage involved here.
Summary of Offense:
At around midnight on April 16, 1991, the defendant threw gasoline on the victim, Traci Crozier, his ex-girlfriend, as she was lying in the front seat of her car. The victim received third-degree burns to more than ninety percent of her body and died several hours later in the hospital.
Hall was sentenced to death on March 11, 1992.As an opponent of the death penalty, I'm not going to be johnny one-note and merely talk about possible innocence or racism or the like. It is readily admitted that some of these people committed really horrible crimes though that's a mixed bag (e.g., someone who murders someone during a robbery should get a long prison sentence, but the death penalty should have a higher test than that). This is a horrible crime -- that extra bit of torture is the sort of thing that will get you a death sentence. It won't surprise that she was an estranged girlfriend. The link provides a picture of the victim.
Why did it take so long? How strong is this argument? As these go, the facts tend to be mixed, some arguments stronger than others. This factors in when balancing equities, including laws that limit time to make certain types of challenges. The woman's feelings on her experience changed over time and early in the appeals process the resources to even find her was limited. The article provides some remarks from family members, including mention that they think an execution might serve some sort of closure. Feelings tend to be mixed there. And, I have repeatedly found cases where families do not want an execution.Attorneys for Lee Hall say they have found a woman — simply known as “Juror A” — who now admits she failed to disclose during Hall’s jury selection process nearly 26 years ago that she had been repeatedly raped and abused by her former husband.
It teaches that where (as here) the question in dispute is whether the State’s chosen method of execution cruelly superadds pain to the death sentence, a prisoner must show a feasible and readily implemented alternative method of execution that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain and that the State has refused to adopt without a legitimate penological reason.Earlier, Justice Alito in passing denied that the procedure at issue was like "burning at the stake" so the full test was not pressed. And, even in the last case, the opinion refuted there was really a problem. But, the rule is horrible: if an execution method really is cruel -- and cruel means of punishment is surely a core purpose of the clause -- it is cruel even if the state cannot "readily implement" an execution otherwise. The syllogism that the death penalty is constitutional so the state has to have a means to execute falls apart with scrutiny. Imprisonment is constitutional. If for some reason the only prison was freezing cold and filled with vermin, it would not be constitutional to put the person there.
This pattern is a testament to the Lemon test’s shortcomings. As Establishment Clause cases involving a great array of laws and practices came to the Court, it became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not resolve them. It could not “explain the Establishment Clause’s tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative meetings, . . . certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays, including Thanksgiving.” Van Orden, supra, at 699 (opinion of Breyer, J.). The test has been harshly criticized by Members of this Court, lamented by lower court judges, and questioned by a diverse roster of scholars.The [2019] result was a given though it seemed off to some who were not strict about such things -- a forty foot cross, owned the Maryland, honoring WWI dead had a certain Christian flavor to it. The cross was originally built shortly after the war, but turned over to the state in the 1960s. A Gorsuch might Scalia-like wonder about line drawing, but that is surely old enough for the plurality's (via Alito, who now seems to be the go to for religious cases if he has the majority; see, e.g., Hobby Lobby) new test regarding a "presumption of constitutionality for longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices." The rough categories in the opinion (the many cases split around six ways) included holiday displays here.
Where monuments, symbols, and practices with a longstanding history follow in the tradition of the First Congress in respecting and tolerating different views, endeavoring to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and recognizing the important role religion plays in the lives of many Americans, they are likewise constitutional.Breyer favors balancing tests that promote certain purposes and those (see again the Ten Commandments case, for which he provided a fifth vote while not joining the four conservatives' more open-ended support of religious monuments deemed acceptable for promoting general messages, Scalia not quite getting his way there for thinking Ten Commandments monuments can be a means for state endorsement of monotheism) criteria overlapped his concerns. Breyer also felt avoiding religious divisiveness was key here and going after old monuments here seemed to him not worth the controversy. OTOH, he dissented in a school voucher case just for that reason. Thus, Van Orden was 5-4 even with O'Connor (in the majority in the voucher case) voting with the liberals.
As one whose children, as a matter of free choice, have been sent to privately supported Church schools, I may challenge the Court's suggestion that opposition to this plan can only be anti-religious, atheistic, or agnostic. My evangelistic brethren confuse an objection to compulsion with an objection to religion. It is possible to hold a faith with enough confidence to believe that what should be rendered to God does not need to be decided and collected by Caesar.The issue there was release time where public school students either could stay in school or go to religious exercises off campus, the matter for three justices turning on the location (off campus as compared to on). The issue soon was school prayer, but even one of the three dissenters there ("no" means "no" Justice Black, who repeatedly found exceptions) dropped a footnote that became a bit telling in this field:
There is, of course, nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this instance.Engel v. Vitale and another case involving reading bible verses in school was accepted by JFK, who had his own issues -- Catholics once upon a time seen as somewhat tainted (some feel that way today given the Supreme Court is controlled basically by five of them, of the conservative sort, a lapsed Catholic from the Bronx deemed not worth counting). Then, there was a bunch of cases where they had to figure out what is and is not okay funding wise. Early on, basically it was books and maybe some sort of vouchers to parents or adults like a blind person who wanted to get a religious education. The rules loosened and recently even not providing funds given stricter state rules was deemed unconstitutional. The breadth of that development might come out in a case this very term.
When a city so openly promotes the religious meaning of one religion's holidays, the benefit reaped by that religion and the disadvantage suffered by other religions is obvious. Those persons who do not share those holidays are relegated to the status of outsiders by their own government; those persons who do observe those holidays can take pleasure in seeing the symbol of their belief given official sanction and special status.
Fox v. City of Los Angeles (Cal. 1978) [Easter/Xmas cross]
BLACKMUN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-A, IV, and V, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts I and II, in which STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which STEVENS, J., joined, an opinion with respect to Part VII, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part VI. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in Part II of which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 623. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 637. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 646. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 655.I first started to read this case back in the 1990s when doing so involved going to the library and reading the relevant volume. The various opinions cover various bases with the plurality (at times only speaking for himself) trying to thread the needle oh so finely. Basically, a creche standing alone (except for what amounted to framing) at a courthouse was too much for O'Connor (the other four dissented in the first creche case, another bunch of opinions to read, Blackmun with a separate dissent there saying the rules basically cheapened religion by only allowing government endorsements of watered down religion, a theme for Stevens too in a few school funding cases). This led to people ridiculing the rules -- so you need how many snowmen? But, the basic idea is right as a basic floor to avoid favoritism.
The variables that a court should consider in determining whether a display has the effect of advancing or endorsing religion include: (1) the location of the display; (2) whether the display is part of a larger configuration including nonreligious items; (3) the religious intensity of the display; (4) whether the display is shown in connection with a general secular holiday; (5) the degree of public participation in the ownership and maintenance of the display; and (6) the existence of disclaimers of public sponsorship of the display.Stevens provided an example here that one or more justices pointed as a gotcha during oral arguments -- the friezes in the very courtroom. They weren't some stand alone matter like the Ten Commandments display that years back got Judge Roy Moore in trouble. They are a series of lawgivers, of various types, in a wider display. A stand alone Moses receiving the commandments from God would be quite another matter. CJ Roberts during the peace cross oral argument found such balancing unpleasant. But, judges and juries do that in various contexts.
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully six-feet under[.]Professor Segall and others have called out Scalia's inconsistencies but in general again any "test" isn't like some sort of mathematical formula going to solve everything here. Breyer's balancing might seem nice to some conservatives in the peace cross case, but less so in some other context where strict rules seem ideal.
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.
